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I. ON PHARMACEUTICALS, SUNGLASSES, AND OTHER
GRAY MATTERS

Globalization has made the world smaller and more homogeneous in
terms of both culture and government policy.' A recent example of this
convergence is the common policy response by the United States and
South African governments to a shared problem.2 The problem is the high
price of pharmaceutical products. The policy response is the creation of
gray markets, or reimportation (or parallel importation) of patented
products from overseas markets to create competition in the domestic
pharmaceutical market. Although ostensibly the policy responses are the
same, there are important differences which present an important case
study of the relationships among patents, human rights, and competition.
The problem posed by the high price of pharmaceuticals is a familiar
one The solution proposed of creating gray markets is less familiar. A
gray market is an unauthorized distribution of a good or service.4 It is
different from a black market, which involves the distribution of a product
or service that is illegal to distribute, such as cocaine or sexual services. In
a gray market, the product or service itself is not illegal, but the means of
distribution is unauthorized. The classic example of the gray market is
provided by small retail outlets selling electronic goods on 42nd Street in
New York City and in Chinatown of San Francisco. These outlets sell
electronic products that are not illegal to sell in the United States, but the
outlets are not authorized by the manufacturer. The retailers obtain the
products overseas where they are being sold at a price lower than the
prevailing price in the United States. Because of the price differential, it is
profitable to purchase the goods overseas, transport them to the United
States, and sell them here.

1. BENJAMiN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 4-5 (1995) (describing tendencies to
homogenization in the global economy); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE., THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 3-5 (1998) (describing

cultural homogenization through the proliferation of brand names and trademarks).
2. 146 CONG. REC. D776-216 (daily ed. July 19,2000) (amending the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act to allow importation of covered products); Consumer Project on Technology,
South Africa and Access to Pharmaceutical Drugs, at http://www.cptech.org/ipihealth/sa (last
visited Apr. 9, 2001) (collecting materials on the debate and experience of South Africa).
3. Forjournalistic accounts, see Stephen S. Hall, The ClaritinEffect: PrescriptionforProfit,

N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2001, at 40-43 (reviewing the problem of prescription drug prices in
the United States); Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Jan. 28, 2001, at 26-28

(reviewing pharmaceuticals in the AIDS crisis). For a technical discussion of the costs of drug
development, see Michael Kremer, Creating Markets forNew Vaccines, Draft Working paper35-38
(May 12, 2000) (on file with author).
4. Shubha GhoshAn EconomicAnalysis ofthe Common ControlException to GrayMarket
Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 375-85 (1994); Nancy T. Gallini & Aidan Hollis, A
ContractualApproach to the Gray Market, 19 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 1, 3-7 (1999).
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The question raised by gray markets is whether their lack of
authorization should.imply illegality. Should the state authorize gray
markets and take affirmative steps to foster their development? In the
electronic outlets example, the manufacturer typically designates certain
authorized dealers through contract. Contracts limit the number of dealers
in a particular geographic market and may also limit the types of customers
to whom the goods may be sold. The gray marketers for electronic products
have, of course, not breached any contract terms since they are not in
privity with the manufacturer. The authorized dealers very likely have not
breached any terms of the contract with the manufacturer since the
authorized dealer has not sold outside the territory designated in the
contract. Furthermore, any customer restrictions in the contract most likely
have not been violated, unless the authorized dealer knew that he was
selling to a gray marketer. Contract law would not serve as a basis for
challenging the legality of gray marketing.'
Intellectual property law, however, would provide a basis for legal
challenge and has been the body of law appealed to in legal claims against
gray marketing. When the gray market products or services are branded,
the trademark owner may have a strong claim of trademark infringement
against the gray marketer especially if there may be consumer confusion
as to whether the manufacturer endorses the gray market sale.'
Furthermore, the packaging of the product and the product itself, for
example books and songs, may be copyrighted.7 Distribution of products
protected by copyright would constitute copyright infringement. Finally,
United States patent law gives the patent owner the exclusive right to
make, use and sell the patented item within the United States and to enjoin
the importation ofthe patented item into the United States from overseas

5. Even though lack of privity limits the efficacy of contract law in regulating the gray
market, a combination of contract, tort, and antitrust laws could prove effective. See Gallini &
Hollis, supranote 4, at 18-19.
6. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,285-95 (1988) (discussing the role ofthe
U.S. Customs Office and corporate control in the gray market); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States,
981 F.2d 1330, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing the role of consumer confusion and material
difference).
7. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152-54 (1998)
(holding that the first sale doctrine limits copyright claims against gray marketers regardless of
where the sale occurred when gray market goods originated in the United States); see also BMG
Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that first sale doctrine does not

apply when gray market goods originated overseas).
8. "The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant
and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any
specified part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). This provision has been read to
prevent contractual import bans of patented items into the United States. Beckton, Dickinson & Co.
v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d 267, 269-70 (6th Cir. 1936). For a discussion of patent law and parallel
importation in the United States, see COMPETIiON POLICYAND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGiiTS
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Ifthe gray market product or service incorporates patented items or is itself
patented, then patent law would serve as a means to prevent the gray
market.
However, there are very important limits within intellectual property
that would protect gray markets. Under trademark law, the plaintiff must
show that there is likelihood of confusion as to the source of the product.
The classic trademark case is when a manufacturer makes a product and
affixes a competitor's brand to the product, making it seem that the
competitor produced it. Gray marketing is very different from the classic
case. The gray market goods were manufactured by the trademark owner.
The manufacturer distributed the product overseas through authorized
channels in which they were purchased and laterresold inthe United States
through unauthorized channels. Consequently, there cannot be any
consumer confusion or deception as to the source of the product. The main
qualification to this limitation is that if the products and services
distributed in the foreign market are of a lower or different quality than
similarly branded products in the United States, then the trademark owner
would have a9 cause of action against the gray marketer for trademark
infringement.
Copyright law has similar limitations. If the gray marketer bought the
product or service overseas from an authorized dealer and redistributed it
within the United States, and the product or service was legally created
under U.S. copyright law, then the gray marketer would be protected from
violating the copyright owner's right of exclusive distribution within the
United States under the first sale doctrine. ° Under this doctrine, a
copyright owner cannot prevent the distribution ofa copyrighted work after
the owner has made the first sale of the work. The doctrine is an example
of the broader principle of the exhaustion of rights, which applies
potentially to all intellectual property rights. In the area of trademark law,
the principle of exhaustion will limit the ability of the trademark owner to
prohibit sales of the branded item after the item has been sold in the
geographic market where the trademark is recognized.
The principle of exhaustion, and its specific application in the first sale
doctrine, has been applied in two very important and recent gray market
cases. In the United States, the Supreme Court held that the first sale
doctrine barred a claim of copyright infringement against a gray marketer
when the product was lawfully made under U.S. copyright law." In the
European Community, the European Court of Justice held that the
manufacturer of trademarked sunglasses could prohibit the sale of gray
INTHE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 408-11 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy Gallini eds., 1998).
9. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 293; see also Lever Bros., 981 F.2d at 1338.

10. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
11. See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 147.
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market sunglasses in Austria that were obtained from a dealer in
Bulgaria. 2 The sale to the dealer in Bulgaria could not exhaust the
trademark owner's rights because the trademark was not registered in
Bulgaria.'3 Therefore, the trademark owner had not exhausted any
economic rights in the brand."'
Patent law offers the strongest protection against the gray market,
without the limitations noted for trademark and copyright protection. If the
gray marketed product is patented, then, under the law of all jurisdictions,
the patent owner has the right to exclude all imports and the exclusive right
to distribute within the geographic boundaries of the patent jurisdiction.
Because of this strong protection, the patent owner obtains strong rights to
produce and market the patented item within each geographic market in
which she has a patent.1 5 Gray markets in the United States are extremely
rare when patent law comes into play. Gray markets, however, are quite
active in the European Union, particularly for pharmaceuticals. 6 The
European Court of Justice has held that the sale of a patented
pharmaceutical anywhere in the European Union, even in a jurisdiction
where the patent is not registered, exhausts the rights ofthe patent owner. 17
With this background, we can now consider the pharmaceutical
industry. The high prices charged for patented drugs reflect the strong
protection accorded by patent law. The protection of patent law is
enhanced by trademark law, which is used to obtain proprietary rights in
the shape and color of the pills, even after the patent has expired. In South
Africa, a market has developed to provide low cost alternatives for
patented AIDS drugs through both generic manufacturers that produce in
violation of South African patent law and through gray marketers, who
import patented drugs from India into South Africa. Both activities have
been challenged by Western pharmaceutical companies in a recent lawsuit
filed against the South African government in a South African court. 8 In
the United States, Congress passed legislation in October 2000, as part of
a general appropriation bill for agriculture, that authorized the

12. Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmiedv. HartlauerHandelsgesellschat, E.C.R. 1-4799
(1998).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The principle of exhaustion has been applied to permit the importation of gray market
goods that are patent-infringing when the goods have been distributed without an express
contractual restriction in the contract of sale or license. Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185, 185-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1885); Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 F. 524, 527 (2d. Cir. 1893).
16. Joined Cases C-267/95 & C-268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., E.C.R. 1-6285
(1996); Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, E.C.R. 2063 (1981).
17. Id.
18. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. President ofthe Rep. of S. Aft., No. 4183/98 (Transvaal Provincial
Div., filed Feb. 18, 1998).
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reimportation of patented pharmaceutical products from Canada into the
United States, subject to approval from the Department of Health and
Human Services. 9 Then Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna
Shalala, refused to authorize such reimports for fear that the gray market
pharmaceuticals would not meet United States safety standards." Her
decision and its support by President Clinton were both controversial,
especially in light of the support of the pharmaceutical companies for the
President's earlier campaign. Current Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Tommy Thompson, is reconsidering the measure.2 In both
instances, we see the use of the gray market to limit and regulate the rights
of patent owners.
What is even more interesting about these policies is that the gray
market is being commandeered to address what is essentially a human
rights issue.' Professor Rosemary Coombe has addressed how human
rights and economic rights merge in the regulation of culture, particularly
with the issue ofintellectual property protection for indigenous knowledge
and folkdore.' In her examples, the recognition of intellectual property
rights in indigenous knowledge can further the human rights goals of
cultural and identity protection.24 With respect to the case of the
pharmaceutical industry, human rights and intellectual property rights are
in seemingly irreconcilable conflict. Through high prices, patent owners
are denying access to life-saving or pain-reducing drugs. Since patent
owners are granted a very strong, if not absolute, right to exclude, the only

19. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-948, at 39 (2001) ("Making Appropriations for Agriculture
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Programs for the Fiscal
Year Ending Sept. 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes," amending 21 U.S.C. § 381 etseq.).
20. Robert Pear, In a Turnaround,White House Kills Drug-ImportPlan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 2000, at Al; Marc Kaufman, Shalala Halts Bid to Lower Drug Costs; ReimportationBill's
'FatalFlaws' Cited, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al; Alissa J. Rubin, Plan Dropped to
Reimport US. Made Medications,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al.
21. Hearing on the Nomination of Tommy Thompson to be Sec 'y of Health and Human
Services Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, andPensions, 107th Cong. 59 (Jan.

19, 2001). Transcripts of Thompson's testimony are available at http://www.kaisemetwork.org
/health cast/uploaded files/day_2_Transcriptof gov.pdf (last visisted May 30,2001).
22. For a discussion of the complexity of the meaning of human rights, see Makau Mutua,
Savages, Victims, andSaviors: The MetaphorofHumanRights, 42 HARV. INT'LL.J. 201,207,295
(2001) (critiquing the notion of human rights law as a tool for saving savages and victims by

imposing aWestern notion ofthe good society as opposed to recognizing a"construction thatworks
for all"). A discussion of the universal appeal of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
can be found in MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEw: ELEANOR ROOsEVELT AND THE
UNIvERsAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RiGHTS 232-33 (2001).

23. Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the
ConservationofBiodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STuD. 59, 61-62 (1998).
24. Id. at 80-81.
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way to grant access to the drugs is by limiting the rights of the patent
owners. Sovereigns, since they grant initial patent rights, could in theory
limit the rights ofpatent owners under some more salient principle. In fact,
Trade Related Intellectual Property Systems (TRIPS) allows signatory
nations to limit intellectual property rights in the case of emergency or lifethreatening situations.' However, TRIPS also imposes procedures that
must be followed in these situations.26 The creation of a gray market seems
to provide an ingenious way to use the market to create competition and
resolve pressing human rights issues.
The question, of course, is whether allowing gray markets for
pharmaceuticals is effective. I address this question in this Article and
conclude that while the gray market solution is appropriate in South Africa,
its effectiveness is questionable in the United States as proposed. While
ideally it would be more appropriate to address the problems directly as
human rights matters,27 the solution of creating gray markets may be the
most effective within the constraints of the current legal system. However,
the gray market must be created in a suitable and rational fashion. I
develop these points as follows. Part II presents an overview of the
economics of intellectual property and gray markets, focusing specifically,
on the fixed cost and the public goods problems. Part III addresses the
United States and South Africa's experiences with pharmaceuticals and
assesses the gray market proposal in each context. Part IV focuses on the
efficacy of limiting patent rights through the gray market, and Part V
concludes.

25. "Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 87 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
26. Article 41 imposes the requirement that procedures concerning the enforcement of
intellectual property rights "be fair and equitable." Id. art. 41(2). Article 30 permits restrictions on
intellectual property rights that "do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests ofthe patent owner, taking account
of the legitimate interests of third parties." Id. art. 30. For restrictions that do unreasonably conflict

with the right's normal exploitation or do unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of third
parties, the requirements of Article 31 are to be complied with by the signatory state before such
restrictions can be imposed. Id. art. 31. Provisions equivalent to Article 30 apply to trademarks and
copyrights, but there are no equivalents to Article 31 for trademarks and copyrights.
27. Here, I mean "human rights" in the deeper sense used by Professor Mutua. See Mutua,
supra note 22, at 201, 243 (critiquing the human rights paradigm for offering only a "script of
rights" as opposed to a system that demonstrates a respect for many cultures).
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II. FIXED COSTS, PUBLIC GOODS, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS SYSTEMS

There are two poles to the debate over the protection of intellectual
property, namely the strong protection position and the open access
position.2" Advocates of the strong protection position contend that the
creation of intellectual property would be undermined unless the creator
has complete and nearly absolute control over the uses, distribution, and
marketing of her intellectual property. Absent such control, less intellectual
property would be produced. At the other extreme are those who advocate
open access since intellectual property is an important input for the
creation of new works and involves expression that is important for the
development of the marketplace for ideas. This position would advocate
very weak or non-existent intellectual property rights because of
democratic and communitarian values.
Intellectual property illustrates two classic economic problems, that of
fixed costs and that of public good provision. Strong protectionists and
open access advocates focus on only one of these two problems, ignoring
the other. A full understanding of intellectual property law entails
addressing both problems. The production of intellectual property is
expensive and involves large fixed costs.29 No one would expend such
costs unless there was some guarantee of a reasonable return to the
investment. Normally such return would be earned by selling the item
produced in the marketplace. The problem with items protected by
intellectual property is that the costs of production entail very high fixed
costs and low variable costs. Consequently, the marginal costs of
production will be low. Since a competitive market will tend to drive
prices down to marginal costs, prices in a competitive market will be
driven to a point where it may not be possible to cover fixed costs, and the
enterprise will be unprofitable. This classic fixed cost problem affects
many large scale industries, such as railroads and utilities, and has
provided the rationale for regulating such industries.3 ° The degree of
regulation has been controversial, ranging from direct price regulation to
government management of the development of facilities. Intellectual
property provides another means of resolving the fixed cost problem:
giving the creator a strong monopoly right in the creation frees the creator

28. For an excellent historical and economic account of this debate, see Gillian K. Hadfield,
The Economics ofCopyright:An HistoricalPerspective,38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 33-

45 (1992).
29. JEAN TIRoLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRAL ORGANIZATION 307-08 (1988).
30. HERBERTHOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISEANDAMERcANLAW, 1836-1937, at308-22(1991)
(describing the fixed cost controversy).
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from the forces of competition that would otherwise make the enterprise
unprofitable.
Intellectual property, however, evinces not only the fixed cost problem
but also the public goods problem. A public good is one that is non-rival
and non-excludable, meaning that consumption can be shared by a large
group of individuals without depleting the supply of the good.31 Ordinary
consumer goods, such as cars and food, are rival and excludable. A fixed
stock of these consumer goods will be depleted as consumers use the
goods, and sharing is only minimally possible. Public goods, such as
music, movies, news, and information, can be used by a potentially infinite
number of consumers without diminishing the amount of entertainment
and information. Some public goods exhibit congestion costs, which are
costs associated with too many people using the good.32 An example
outside the area of intellectual property is provided by a public swimming
pool. Many people can share its use, but too many people raise the costs of
using the pool by increasing congestion. Such costs also arise in the
context of intellectual property use. For example, trademarks are public
goods, but if the trademark becomes overused it loses its value as an
indicator of source and quality. Too much use imposes the equivalent of
congestion costs that diminish the value of the good.33
The public goods aspect of intellectual property is captured by the
cliche, "information wants to be free." A corollary of this cliche is that
information should be free since attempts to curb its use through price or
other mechanisms would be futile. Information is non-rival and nonexcludable, according to this argument, and therefore should be made open
for all to use. The problem with this argument is that it ignores the costs in
producing information. 4 Economic theory does not state that if a good is
public that it should be free. Instead, economic theory suggests that such
goods cannot be provided through a market mechanism alone. Either the
government provides public goods (such as roads and national defense) or
the government subsidizes the market to provide these goods. In addition,
economists recognize the role for non-market and non-governmental
institutions, such as non-profit entities, in providing public goods." The
problem posed by public goods for economists and lawyers is determining
what set of institutions should be adopted to produce and provide public
goods in an economically rational and effective manner.

31. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALrIES, PUBLIC GOODS,
AND CLUB GOODS 10-13 (1986).
32. Id. at 272-77.
33. ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 79-82 (1998) (describing the process of genericide).
34. JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID, THE SOcL4L LIFE OF INFORMATION 65-66 (2000).
35. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LMITs OF ORGANIZATION 21-23 (1974).
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Before discussing how intellectual property law addresses both the
fixed cost problem and the public goods problem, and how these problems
result in the development of gray markets, let me describe how economists
would propose resolving the public goods problem. One way, as discussed
before, is to have the government supply the public good, financed by
general tax revenues.6 The problem with this scheme is establishing a tax
structure that is both fair and efficient. A flat tax structure would result in
some people paying more than their value for the good and some less. The
unfairness of this is obvious, especially for those who are forced to pay for
something they do not value. The scheme is also inefficient because ofthe
separation of payment from individual valuation. An alternative is to use
a system of user fees that allow consumers to pay for the amount of the
public good used. Toll roads and fees for entry into parks are examples of
such user fees. The problem is that this system would work for some public
goods, such as roads and parks, but not for others such as national defense.
Furthermore, determining the appropriate user fee structure imposes a cost
on government that again must be borne somehow.
Privatization is another possible economic solution to the problem of
public goods creation and provision. Private firms could compete in the
creation and provision of public goods, and the firms could develop the
appropriate payment structure to cover their costs and guarantee a return.
The problem is that private provision of a public good may be inefficient
because of the free rider problem. If one firm provides the public good,
then there is little incentive for another firm to do so, especially since
public goods are non-rival and non-excludable by definition. Therefore,
competition will not likely survive in private markets for public goods.
Furthermore, pricing must be modified to deal with the sale of public
goods. In markets for ordinary consumer goods, firms charge the same
price for goods of a given quality and quantity. Setting such a price
structure for public goods would cause the same problem as financing
public goods through taxes: some will pay more and some less than their
valuation of the public good.
The solution is to allow firms to price discriminate. Just as governments
can set user fees, firns should be allowed to price discriminate in the
pricing of public goods so that consumers pay according to their valuation
of the good. Ideally, each consumer will be charged exactly the amount
they value the good, and the firm will obtain enough revenue to recoup the
costs and earn a return. This arrangement is known as perfect price
discrimination, and economists recognize that perfect price discrimination

36. For an overview of how public goods are provided, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE II, at 17-25 (rev. ed. 1989).
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is efficient." The problem is the costs of a system of price setting tailored
to the individual consumer, and the potential that discriminatory pricing
may not
be perfect and may result in inefficiencies arising from market
38
power.

The last economic solution is to have joint production and provision of
public goods by both private and governmental entities. Education is a
public good that is provided through this mechanism in almost all
countries. Such a system has the costs of the governmental and private
arrangements described above, but also has one clear benefit: the potential
for competition between public and private entities. Even though the
competition may be limited (there may be only one private entity and only
one public entity), the mixed scheme potentially provides choices that the
separate arrangements do not.
Intellectual property law resolves the fixed cost and public goods
problems by granting a limited right of exclusion to the creator of
intellectual property.39 The right of exclusion gives the creator some
monopoly power to recoup the fixed costs of investment without being
subjected to the destructive forces of competition. The limitation of these
rights through such provisions as time duration, fair use, and permitted use
protects the public goods aspect ofintellectual property. The law, however,
creates a baseline against which market and business forces work to
produce and distribute intellectual property. The limited right to exclude
gives the owner of intellectual property leeway in how to fashion the
marketing of intellectual property.
Technological and social methods of exclusion serve to complement the
legal methods. Territorial restrictions, retailing, and the packaging of
products permits the owner of intellectual property to further privatize the
protected work and permits the owner to extract value from the consumer.
Territorial restrictions are imposed, for example, in franchising or through
restrictions on where and to whom intellectual property protected goods
can be sold. These restrictions further limit competition and allow the
intellectual property owner to extract more for the creation. Retailing goes
hand-in-hand with territorial restrictions and creates another layer in the
distribution of intellectual property that creates value added through the
provision of service and generation of advertising and also permits the
intellectual property owner to extract value for the work. Finally,
packaging serves an advertising function and as a means of bundling
products, such as music, that allows the owner of intellectual property to

37. Louis PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 12-16 (1983).

38. For an excellent critique ofthe theory ofprice discrimination as applied to copyright, see
Julie E. Cohen, Copyrightand the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1799-1891 (2000).
39. D~mnsW. CARLToN&JEFFREYM.PERLOFF, MODERNINDUSTRIALORGANIZATION50205 (3d ed. 2000).
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sell and extract value for her creation. These extra-legal mechanisms
permit the intellectual property owner to recoup fixed costs that provide
the incentives to create and distribute public goods.
But exclusion mechanisms are imperfect, especially when public goods
are concerned. Territorial restrictions, regulated largely by contracts
between the manufacturer and the distributor, can be bypassed. Alternative
distribution mechanisms to retailing, such as resale by private consumers,
can be created post-sale. Goods can be unpackaged and repackaged as
consumers play songs for friends and create their own mixes. The
exclusive right to exclude can give the intellectual property owner only
limited control over the range ofbusiness and social practices that facilitate
the distribution of non-rival and non-excludable goods. It is on this point
that the cliche of information wanting to be free actually rings true; owners
of intellectual property cannot feasibly control all dimensions of its
dissemination. Gray markets, or alternate distribution mechanisms, arise
to fill in the gaps in the distribution channels created by intellectual
property owners.'
Of course, the response by intellectual property owners has been to
close the gray markets through the one tool that is potentially successful,
legal regulation. But the law of the gray market reflects a checkered and
largely unsuccessful means of restricting the gray market.4 I discuss this
body of law elsewhere, but summarize here the main legal tools intellectual
property owners have used to prevent the gray market. Trade restrictions
have been of mixed success because of the authority given to agents of the
customs office in determining what gets in and what does not. Claims for
trademark infringement have been ofmixed success since the trademarked
goods actually originate from the trademark owner, but only through a
different distribution mechanism. Copyright law has little weight because
of the first sale doctrine. Patent law offers the strongest support for
restricting the gray market because of the strong rights granted under patent
law of exclusive distribution rights in the entire United States. But patent
law applies to a narrow set of intellectual property, namely novel, nonobvious, and useful inventions, and hence serves as a tool for only a few
industries, such as pharmaceuticals. But even for those industries, patent
law's power has potentially been limited by Congressional legislation
allowing reimportation of certain drugs, a policy whose status is currently
under debate. Gray markets cannot be so easily closed or regulated.
The economic relationships among patent law, international trade, and
gray markets provide one basis for assessing the policy of reinportation.
Patent law gives the patent owner exclusive rights to make, use, and sell
40. Shubha Ghosh, Turning Gray into Green: Some Observations on Napster, HASTINGS

COMM. & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the author).
41. Ghosh, supranote 4, at 378-82.
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the patented item in the domestic market. This exclusive right gives the
owner some degree of monopoly power in markets in which the owner has
patent rights. In each market, the patent owner can package the patented
item so as to control its dissemination through the market. For example,
with pharmaceutical products, the packaging occurs through embodying
the patent in pills or other items that allow control of .dosage and
dispensing to consumers. Table One depicts a typical monopoly market in
two different situations. The quantity axis measures number of pills sold,
and the price axis measures the price per pill. In each market, the patent
owner can set prices to maximize profits in the two separate markets. Price
differences arise because of differences in costs and demand in the two
markets. The price differential creates the incentive for a gray marketer to
buy in the cheaper market and resell in the more expensive market. Under
patent law, however, the patent owner can prevent the gray marketer from
engaging in such activity. The result is a price differential in two markets
that results from a form of price discrimination.
The debate over pharmaceuticals follows from the inequity ofthis price
differential, especially in the context oflife-saving pharmaceuticals. Given
the benefits from pharmaceutical products, it seems unfair, even if
consistent with market practices, that the price for the same product should
differ across markets. Furthermore, the high price in one market excludes
potential beneficiaries of the drug from access. The response to these
arguments is that it is difficult to correct the price differential and
guarantee broader access without imposing other inequities. For example,
Professor Varian has correctly pointed out that if prices were to be
equalized in the two markets through some mechanism, the question
remains which price would prevail, a price closer to the higher price or one
closer to the lower price.42 If the price equalization were left to political
mechanisms, then the lower price might prevail resulting in lost profits in
the high price jurisdiction. On the other hand, price equalization may lead
to the higher price prevailing in the marketplace, resulting in even greater
loss in access. Which result will prevail depends on the relative demands
in the two countries and the mechanism for price equalization. But
whichever result prevails, other inequities might result.
An obvious response to the price differential is to attack the monopoly
power that makes the price discrimination possible.43 But this solution

42. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE

NETWORK ECONOMY 44-45 (1999); see also Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; A Big Factorin
PrescriptionDrugPricing:Location, Location, Location, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at C2.
43. The Robinson-Patman Act, while ostensibly making price discrimination illegal, applies
to differential pricing by wholesalers in selling to retailers. AMERICANBARASSOCIATION SECTION
OF ANiTTRUST LAW, APRIMER ONTHEFEDERAL PRICEDISCRIMINATIONLAWS: AGENERAL REVIEW

OF THE ROBiNSON-PATMAN ACT FOR BusN;ss MANAGERs 3-8 (2d ed. 2000). For a discussion of
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entails challenging the vested patent rights of the patent owner and stokes
the flames of the politics of intellectual property law." Compulsory
licensing would create competition, but would also directly challenge the
exclusive rights granted to the patent owner to decide who should be given
the right to make, use, or sell the patented item and on what terms.45 State
subsidies or income transfers grantedto consumers ofpharmaceuticals also
are politically difficult to muster, introducing the politics of taxation into
an intellectual property debate. Attacking anti-competitive practices
through antitrust law is another possibility, but since the price differential
occurs across international borders, questions of comity and jurisdiction
pose impediments to enforcement. 4 ' Creating gray markets, it seems, is a
politically feasible manner of ensuring competition and reducing prices.
Although the creation of gray markets challenges the patent owner's
exclusive rights, the solution has the advantages of avoiding the politics of
redistribution and the difficulties of enforcing antitrust laws globally.
Authorizing gray markets, of course, introduces additional costs as
well.47 A gray marketer will bear the cost oftransportation between the two
markets and will engage in gray marketing until the price differential
between the two markets just equals the transportation costs. Gray
marketing will tend to lower the price of the product in the high price
market, which is its intended effect. But gray marketing may raise or lower
the price of the product in the market from which the gray marketer is
reimporting. The ambiguity of the effect in the low price country reflects
the two countervailing effects of gray marketing. The first is the upward
pressure on price in the low price market created by the increase in demand
for the product from the gray marketer. The second is the downward
pressure placed on price by global competition and the price equalization
between the two markets. It is possible that the second effect dominates the
the Act from a business and economic perspective, see SHAPIRO &VARIAN, supra note 42, at 299300.
Article 40 of TRIPS authorizes signatory nations to control and regulate anti-competitive uses
of intellectual property rights. TRIPS, supra note 25, art. 40. The scope of this power is yet to be
explored. See CHiSTOPHER ARUP, THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENTS:
GLOBALIZNG LAW THROUGH SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 210-11 (2000); see also
124 (1998).
BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 'NTO AGREBM
44. See MICHAELRYAN, KNOWLEDGEDIPLOMACY:GLOBALCOMPET1TIONANDTHEPOLITICS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8-11 (1998) (documenting economic and political forces leading to
TRIPS).
45. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 305-14 (Anthony D'Amato &
Doris Estelle Long eds., 1996) (analyzing compulsory licensing in copyright and patent law as a
government taking).
46. See Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. and Global Competition and Trade-Jurisdiction and Comity,
ANTrUsT REP., Oct. 1993, at 3-4.

47. The economic analysis presented below is taken from my previously published work in
Ghosh, supra note 4, at 409-26.
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first, and the price for the product will fall in both markets. It is also
possible that the price will rise in the low price market while falling in the
high price market. The outcome in the low price market depends on how
responsive demand is to price changes in the two markets. The larger point
is that while gray marketing may have the effect of lowering prices in both
markets, it also raises the possibility of benefitting consumers in the high
price market at the expense of consumers in the low price market. The
tension between the two sets of consumers raises issues for the global
politics of gray marketing.
The creation of gray markets will also affect the behavior of the patent
owner. In order to prevent the gray market and capture market share from
the gray marketer, the patent owner will adopt practices to reduce the price
differential between the two markets. The patent owner has two possible
strategic responses. The first is to alter his licensing practices by altering
royalty fees and other license terms in order to reduce the price differential
between the two markets. The second possibility is for the patent owner to
merge the business entities in the two markets so as to be able to control
the pricing policies in the two markets. The responses from the patent
owner are desirable to the extent that they tend to lower the price
differential that is the source of the problem. However, the result can be
beneficial or harmful depending upon the direction of price movements in
the two markets.
For the sake of discussion, it is useful to describe four possible
scenarios:
A = the gray market is prohibited;4
B = the gray market is allowed,
but there is no response
49
from the patent owner;
C = the gray market is allowed, but the patent owner
responds through licensing terms;5"

48. This scenario is analyzed under the assumption that the prohibition can occur at zero cost.
This is obviously an unrealistic assumption since the gray market may still exist even if ostensibly
illegal or policed. The case is considered, however, as an ideal case forthe purposes of comparison.
49. Under this scenario, the patent owner does not respond, either because the gray market
is legal or because the patent owner cannot control the distribution mechanisms in other countries
through contract or corporate control of business entities overseas.
50. This scenario is the most subtle and needs elaboration. The patent owner will distribute
his patent both domestically and overseas through licensing. The royalty terms of the license will
affect the price in the two markets (in conjunction with, of course, the demand for the patented
product in the two countries and the production costs). Theoretically, if the patent owner can set
the royalty terms, he can affect the price of the patented product in the two markets to make gray
marketing unprofitable. The effectiveness of this policy depends upon the ability of the patent
owner to prevent unlicensed uses. For the sake of analysis here, I assume that unlicensed uses can
be prohibited at zero cost.
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the gray market is allowed, but the patent owner
responds through common control of the two
markets.5

Drawing on economic analysis from my earlier work,52 I can make some
statements about how consumers and non-gray market firms would rank
these four scenarios in the high price and low price markets using a simple
model of linear demand. The rankings53 are as follows:
Table 1. Comparing Different Gray Market Regimes With Respect to
Effects on Firms and Consumers in Domestic and Overseas Markets
High price market
(destination of gray
market goods)
Rankings of
Consumers

Rankings of Nongray market firm

Low price market
(source of gray
market goods)

1. B
2. D
3. C
4. A

1. B
2. D
3. A
4. C

1. A 1. A'
2.D 2.C
3. B
(The rankings of D
and C and of B and
C are ambiguous)

1. B 1. B 1. C
2.A2.D2.A
(The rankings of A
and D, of B and C,
and of D and C are
ambiguous)

Each set of consumers would unambiguously prefer the gray market
scenario with no response to all other scenarios. The second choice would
unambiguously be the gray market scenario with common control. There
would be disagreement over the rankings of a regime with no gray
marketing and a regime with gray marketing controlled through licensing.
Consumers in the high-price market would unambiguously choose gray
marketing with licensing control over a regime where gray marketing is
prohibited. Consumers in the low-price markets, however, would prefer no
51. Under this last scenario, the patent owner obtains ownership and control over the entity
distributing the patented product overseas and sets the royalty structure in each market accordingly
to maximize the joint profits of the entity and prevent gray marketing.
52. Ghosh, supranote 4, at 373-439.
53. For consumers, the rankings of the scenarios are based on the predicted price of the
product under each scenario. Scenarios ranked number one, for example, would result in the lowest
price. For firnms, the rankings are based on predicted profits, with high-ranking scenarios yielding
higher profits than low-ranking scenarios.
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gray marketing. The reason for this discrepancy is that consumers in the
high-price market will always prefer to allow gray marketing. The effect
of gray marketing in the low-price market is always ambiguous. Gray
marketing controlled through licensing, however, would tend to raise
prices in the low-price market while the other forms of gray marketing
would tend to lower prices in the low-price market.
The rankings of the non-gray market firm include several ambiguities.
These ambiguities mean that the comparison of profits across regimes
cannot be made without further information about demand curves and
costs. The non-gray market firm in the high-price market (that is, the
market into which gray market goods would be entering) prefer a regime
where gray marketing is not allowed to all other regimes. Relative rankings
among gray market regimes are difficult to make. The non-gray market
firm in the high-price market would unambiguously prefer a regime where
gray market was controlled by common control to one where the entities
in the two markets were separate. But it is not possible to compare the
scenario where control of the gray market occurs through licensing with
either of the two other methods of controlling the gray market.
Finally, the non-gray market firm in the low-price country, the source
country for the gray market goods, would prefer gray marketing, either
uncontrolled or controlled through licensing to a regime where gray
marketing was prohibited. The firm would also prefer uncontrolled gray
marketing to gray marketing controlled through common ownership. But
it is not possible without further information to compare the regime of
prohibited gray marketing with that of gray marketing controlled through
common ownership in terms of the effects on the profits of the firm in the
source country. It also is not possible to compare gray marketing controlled
through licensing with either uncontrolled gray marketing or gray
marketing controlled through common ownership.
Despite such ambiguities, the analysis of the gray market scenarios
provides a basis for approaching the policies of gray marketing as proposed
in the United States and as implemented in South Africa. Two lessons
emerge from this analysis. First, gray marketing will result in responses
from the patent owner in the manner in which distribution is controlled in
both the destination country and the source country. These responses must
be taken into consideration in assessing gray marketing. Second, the effects
of gray marketing on various groups is mixed and in many cases
ambiguous. Nonetheless, understanding these responses and their mixed
effects is crucial in assessing the efficacy of limiting patent rights and
power through gray markets.
In this Part, I have presented the economics of intellectual property
law and its relationship with the economics of gray marketing. Intellectual
property law is designed to address both the fixed costs and the public
goods problems that characterize information markets. Patent law, unlike
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copyright and trademark, gives the owner an absolute right to make, use,
and sell the patented item in the market that consists of the jurisdiction of
the patent. In the context of international trade, patent law creates price
differentials for the patented item which provides incentives for gray
marketing. If gray marketing were allowed, we would expect the patent
owner to preempt gray marketing by attempting to lower the price
differentials across markets. Gray marketing, therefore, will produce very
complicated responses in global markets depending upon how the patent
owner responds and the demand and costs in all markets. With these
analytical insights, I next address the situation in the United States and
South Africa.
III. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE PROPOSED GRAY MARKETS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA

As described above, both the United States and the South African
governments have attempted to address the issue of access to
pharmaceuticals by the creation of markets through permissive
reimportation, or gray markets. The non-economic issues raised by this
policy are addressed in Part IV. The economics of intellectual property and
gray markets delineated in Part II provide an important basis for assessing
these policies.
I will present an important structural difference between gray
marketing in the United States and in South Africa. In both countries, the
problem arises from patent owners exercising their patent rights and
causing high relative prices for the pharmaceutical product. In both
countries, gray markets are seen as providing effective competition that
will lower prices and benefit consumers. However, gray markets are
created very differently in the two cases. The following diagram illustrates
the two different cases:
CASE ONE: The Round Trip
United Statesl---patented pharmaceuticals--> Canada Canada---gray market pharmaceuticals----> United States
CASE TWO:
Western Companiesl---patented pharmaceuticals-> South Africa
South Africa<---- gray market---lndia
In the case of the United States, the source and destination of the
pharmaceuticals is the same. The drugs are manufactured in Canada under
license from the U.S. patent owner or manufactured in the U.S. under
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license and exported to Canada.54 In the case of South Africa, the source
and destination are different. Western companies import licensed drugs
into South Africa that face competition from gray marketed drugs produced
in India either under a license or without. The different structures of gray
marketing will have different implications for their efficacy. In Case One,
the patent owner has more ability to control the gray market through price
setting that limits the price differential in the two markets. In Case Two,
the patent owner has less ability to control the gray market through
reducing price differentials. This difference in structure with resulting
implications for control is the basis for why, as an economic matter, the
South Afican policy would be more effective than the one in the United
States.
A Reimportationfrom Canadato the UnitedStates
In October2000, President Clinton signed into law an agricultural bill
which contained a provision authorizing the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, "after consultation with the United States Trade
Representative and the Commissioner of Customs," to promulgate
"regulations permitting pharmacists and wholesalers to import into the
United States covered products," meaning prescription drugs other than
controlled substances or biological products." The statutory provision was
deemed to be effective only if the Secretary demonstrated that its
implementation would "pose no additional risk to the public's health and
safety... and result in a significant reduction in the cost of covered
products to the American consumer." 6 The statute also contained a sunset
provision which canceled
the legal effect of the regulations five years after
57
effect.
into
went
they
In December 2000, then Secretary of Health and Human Services
Donna Shalala refused to implement the legislation, contending that there
were serious risks to health from allowing reimports of pharmaceuticals
into the United States from a foreign country." The Secretary also

54. By way of comparison, the first scenario corresponds to what Justice Ginsburg has
described as the "round trip" in her QualityKingconcurrence. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'Anza
Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In the context of

exhaustion of rights under copyright law, the "round trip" scenario would lead to the exhaustion
of rights. Most likely, the second scenario, where the goods do not make a round trip, would not
lead to the exhaustion of rights. See BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318,319 (9th Cir. 1991).
55. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-948, at 39 (2001) ("Making Appropriations for Agriculture
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Programs for the Fiscal
Year Ending Sept. 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes," amending 21 U.S.C. § 381 et. seq.).
56. Id.at 43.
57. Id.
58. Pear, supra note 20, at Al; Kaufman, supranote 20, at Al; Rubin, supra note 20, at Al.
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expressed doubt that the reimportation would result in substantial
reduction in the price of drugs.59 President Clinton supported her decision,
causing yet another controversy in the closing days of the Clinton
Administration. 0 Supporters of the bill indicated suspicions about the
influence of pharmaceutical companies, opponents to gray marketing, on
the measure.61 The legislation is currently in limbo; the newly appointed
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, describes the
'
future of the program as "doubtful."62
The preamble to the legislation lists several Congressional findings on
price differentials in pharmaceuticals between countries and the alarming
rate at which the cost of prescription drugs continues to rise in the United
States.63 Congress concluded that "Americans should be able to purchase
medicines at prices that are comparable to prices for such medicines in
other countries, but efforts to enable such purchases should not endanger
the gold standard for safety and effectiveness that has been established and
maintained in the United States."'" The appeal of allowing reimportation
was based on reports that many elderly Americans were making excursions
to Canada and Mexico solely for the purposes of obtaining prescription
drugs. Reimportation would permit access but place the transportation
costs on gray marketers.
Whether reimportation is an appropriate response rests largely on the
sources for the price differential across markets. The assumption is that
such price differences stem from degrees of protection for intellectual
property in the United States and Canada. But the record suggests that
there has been a convergence in the intellectual property regimes ofthe two
countries over the past decade. While price differences in patented
products may in part reflect differences in regulatory environments,
intellectual property law may not be the source of the price divergence.
Limiting domestic patent rights through gray marketing may not be an

The amendment permits imports from Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland,
or South Africa and countries in the European Union or the European Economic Area if the drug
is authorized forgeneral marketing in the European Economic Area. H.R. CoNF. REP.No. 106-948,
at 41 (incorporating by reference 21 U.S.C. § 382(b) in proposed section 804(f)). I will limit my

discussion to potential imports from Canada since that country has been the focus of the debates
and popular discussion.
59. Pear, supranote 20, at Al; Kaufnan, supranote 20, at Al; Rubin, supranote 20, at Al.
60. Pear, supranote 20, at Al; Kaufnan, supranote 20, atAl; Rubin, supranote 20, at Al;
Michael Kinsley, No Free Lunch at the Pharmacy,WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2000, at A33.
61. Pear, supra note 20, at Al; Kaufman, supranote 20, atAl; Rubin, supranote 20, at Al.
62. Sara Fritz, Election Over, PrescriptionLaw Languishes, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr.
8, 2001, at Al; Anjetta McQueen, Programto Reimport Drugs Likely to Get Axed, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 10, 2001, at All.
63. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-948, at 39.
64. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss4/4

20

Ghosh: Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Li
PILLSAND PATE7MSA LIMIT ON PATENT RIG-MS

appropriate response. But, as I discuss below, an even more compelling
case against reimportation is provided by the predicted response of U.S.
patent holders to gray markets, which may harm non-United States
consumers even as they benefit the United States.
1. United States Background
There are two regulatory forces that shape United States policy toward
the pharmaceutical industry: regulatory review for drug safety and patent
protection. The two have developed symbiotically since the 1970s and
together65 shape the regulatory environment in which drug marketing
occurs.

Regulation of the pharmaceutical industry has been the subject of
debate in the United States since at least 1959 when the Kefauver
Commission issued a report with supporting materials challenging pricing
and other marketing practices in the pharmaceutical industry.' The
Commission alleged monopolistic and anti-consumer practices in the
industry, sparking a debate that has continued to this day on the appropriate
regulation of the industry.67 Industry representatives at the time contended
that the industry was in fact competitive, citing low mark-ups and intensive
competition in the area of research and development.68 In the 1970s, the
debate switched to the over-regulation of the industry and the resulting
unprofitability and threats to innovation. Competitive pressures from Japan
and Germany were centered on pharmaceuticals, and the burdens of the
Food and Drug Administration approval process became the focus of
attention.69 The process, in itselfcumbersome and expensive, was claimed
to stifle the ability of pharmaceutical companies to bring drugs to the
marketplace. The process also was believed to interfere with the patent
process by effectively shortening the life of a granted patent. Regulatory
changes in the 1980s permitted expedited review, and reforms permitted
the patent owner to take advantage of the full duration of patent life.70
The other issue was the availability of competition from generic, or
unbranded, pharmaceutical products. For generic drug manufacturers,
patent protection serves as a barrier to entry and a limitation on

65. William S. Comanor, The PoliticalEconomy ofthe PharmaceuticalIndustry,24J.ECON.
LIT. 1178, 1180-81 (1986).
66. Id. at 1181-82.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. F.M. Scherer, Pricing,Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical

Industry,7 J. ECON. PERSPEacIVES 97, 102, 108-14 (1993).
70. See Comanor, supra note 65, at 1200-02 (describing patent reform); Patricia 1. Carter,
FederalRegulation ofPharmaceuticalsin the UnitedStates and Canada,21 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 215, 227-34 (1999).
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competition. Since generic drugs required FDA approval, the approval
mechanism served as an additional barrier. Patent protection and safety
review posed particularly difficult problems because submission of a
review application to the FDA before the expiration of a drug patent would
constitute infringement of that patent.71 Reforms in the 1980s resolved
these problems by permitting expedited FDA review for generic drugs
prior to patent expiration.' As patent protection increased for the
pharmaceutical industry, some competitive pressures were introduced
through relaxation of the regulatory barriers to generic drugs. 3
Trademarks also serve as barriers to entry for generic drug
manufacturers. Often after the patent expired, pharmaceutical companies
would protect the shape and color of their drugs through trademark law.
The shape and color of a pill often served as a means of brand
identification, easing confusion among consumers and among pharmacists
filling prescriptions. Such brand identification created an additional barrier
to the entry of generic drugs.74 Pharmaceutical companies, through their
exclusive rights to make, sell, and use the patented product, established
brand loyalty and consumer identification with pills of a certain color and
shape that made it difficult for generic drug manufacturers to establish a
consumer base and differentiate their product, except through price. As of
this date, the relationship between trademark protection and patent
protection is still an open question.
The SingerManufactUringCo. and the Kellogg Co. cases from 1896
and 1938 respectively held that expiration of the patent prevented
enforcement of any trademarks in the patented product.' These cases,
however, are not directly relevant to protection of the shape and color of
pills because the patent and trademark protect very different dimensions of
the pill. The patent protects the process by which the pill was manufactured
or the composition of matter comprising the pill; the trademark protects the

71. 35 U.S.C. § 271(eX2)(a) (2000).

72. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). For a discussion of the background leading up to these
developments, see Comanor, supranote 65, at 1202-09. See also Scherer, supranote 69, at 100-03;
Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, LongerPatentsfor Lower ImitationBarriers: The 1984 Drug

Act, 76 AM. EOON. REv. 195, 196-98 (1986).
73. The battle between patented pharmaceuticals and generic drugs in the United States
continues today. This year two courts, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and the
U.S. District Court in Maryland, split on allowing two different drug companies to prevent the
marketing of generic drugs by extending their protection for a patented drug through the life of the
patent. Melody Peterson, Judge Says Mylan CanSell Generic Version ofBristol-MyersDrug,N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at C9.

74. SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1057 (3d Cir. 1980).
75. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185-200 (1896) (denying protection to

the Singer trademark after expiration of patent); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,
116-20 (1938).
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pill's packaging and associated goodwill. A recent Seventh Circuit
decision, in fact, held that expiration of a design patent did not preempt
trademark protection for the design.76 The Supreme Court recently decided
a case involving trade dress protection for an arguably functional design
that had been patented. 7 The Court decided the case on grounds other than
patent preemption and did not address the question of whether an expired
patent negates trademark protection.78 The legal question in the United

States is still open.
Patent protection for pharmaceuticals has provided the industry with
strong protection from competition. The extension of patent life to comply
with regulatory approval and the protection from generic competition serve
to give pharmaceutical firms a strong degree of market control. This
control extends to protection against foreign imports of pharmaceuticals.
Legislation in the late 1980s allowed a patent owner to enjoin the
importation of a product that was manufactured overseas by a process
patented in the United States, even ifthe product itself was not patented.79
Furthermore, a patent owner is given exclusive rights to make, use, and sell
the patented product within the United States.' Patent law provides the
owner with an exclusive territory which, when combined with trademark
protection for the product, gives protection to the owner from interbrand
competition. With this as background, it is easy to see how the
preconditions exist for the creation of a gray market in pharmaceuticals. A
consideration of the Canadian regulatory environment explains why
Canada becomes the likely source for gray marketed pharmaceuticals.
2. Canadian Background
A comparison of the regulatory system governing pharmaceuticals in
the United States and Canada uncovers many similarities in design despite
differences in institutional background."1 The convergence is a recent
phenomenon, with changes to patent law beginning in 1987 attempting to
mimic the United States system of patent protection. This mimicking was

76. Kohler, Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632,63643 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that trademark
protection for design is not an infinite patent). But see Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995) (foreclosing trademark protection on design
after a patent expires when the "product configuration is a significant inventive component of an
invention covered by a utility patent").
77. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., No. 99-1571, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2457, at
* 12-23 (Mar. 20,2001) (holding thatdesign is not protected as trade dress because it is functional).
78. Id
79. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
80. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
81. Carter, supra note 70, at 215 ("The development of [the Canadian and U.S.] drug
regulatory systems has often paralleled each other.").
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arguably not conscious and was most likely motivated by the policy goals
of strengthening the pharmaceutical industry and its ties to health care. 2
As Professors Doern and Sharaput described the reforms: "Patents set the
conditions of profit for the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, and it is this
patents to be used to exert a structural influence over the
which allows
'8 3
industry."
Ifpatent law was being used to strengthen the pharmaceutical industry
in 1987 and after, then patent law prior to 1987 was focused on consumer
protection and competition. The patent regime that existed in Canada from
1869 to 1987 was strikingly different from its U.S. counterpart and very
likely set the institutional structure that permitted competition and
development in the Canadian pharmaceutical industry. In the 1920s,
Canada's patent law was amended to allow extensive compulsory licensing
for patented items that served a public purpose and encompassed
manufacture within Canada." It was in the 1960s, however, that the
Canadian government addressed the problem of high prices and low
competition in the pharmaceutical industries. Bill C-190, which was tabled
in the late 1960s, was part of a larger policy package designed to bring
competition to the pharmaceutical industry through lower tariffs for
imported pharmaceuticals and by permitting the importation of drugs into
the Canadian market.'" Canada had already provided weaker protection for
pharmaceuticals than the United States by protecting pharmaceutical
patents as process and not product patents. This distinction meant that
patent owners' rights extended only to the process by which the product
was made and not the product itself." Finally, the changes in the 1960s
expanded the role for compulsory licensing of manufacturing by relaxing
the requirement that patents subject to the compulsory license had to be
manufactured in Canada. Under the reforms, the pharmaceuticals could be
overseas and the compulsory license permitted sales within
manufactured
7
Canada.1
The 1980s and particularly the 1990s witnessed a reversal in the weak
patent protection accorded to pharmaceuticals under the legislation from
the 1960s." The first big change was the extension of the patent life to
twenty years from the date of grant from the previous ten years (or seven,

82. G. BRUCE DOERN & MARKUS SHARAPUT, CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE
POLITICS OF INNOVATING INSTITUTIONS AND INTERESTS 134-43 (2000).
83. Id. at 148-49.
84. Id. at 34-38.
85. Id. at 46-48.

86. Id. at 50.
87. Id. at 47.
88. Id.at 134-43.
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if the patent was manufactured from Canadian fine chemicals)., 9 The other,
more substantial change, was the repeal of all compulsory licensing for
pharmaceuticals.' The current system is one that accords very strong
patent protection to pharmaceuticals and reverses the goals of competition
and consumer access under the previous regime. But the intellectual
property protection for pharmaceuticals is not completely impenetrable. In
1997, the High Court of Canada denied trademark protection to the shape
and color of pills, reasoning that such markers were meant to protect
pharmacists from confusion in filling prescriptions and consumers from
confusion in recognizing the correct product.9 The shape and color, the
Court decided, were not designed to indicate the source of the product, and
trademark law's sole purpose under Canadian law is source identification. 92
This ruling provides hope for generic manufacturers in the Canadian
pharmaceutical industry.
3. Assessment
My description of the pharmaceutical industries of the United States
and Canada indicate the bases for the creation of a gray market in drugs.
The regulatory and intellectual property regimes create high prices in the
United States and low prices in Canada. The reimportation bill is an
attempt to take advantage of this price differential by authorizing a gray
market.
However, the structure of the gray market is one that may not lead to
the intended effects. What needs to be considered in assessing the efficacy
of the gray market are the possible responses within the industry to the gray
market. If the industry does not respond and the gray market is created,
then the first, and best, situation would arise. As Table One in Part H
indicates, both sets of consumers would prefer an uncontrolled gray
market. Unfortunately, United States firms would least prefer an
uncontrolled gray market. Therefore, we would expect United States firms
to react, either through merger or entering into other corporate control
arrangements with Canadian firms, or through licensing practices. If
corporate control arrangements are entered into (such as through joint
ventures, mergers between Canadian and United States companies, or entry
of United States subsidiaries into the Canadian market), then the second
best situation would arise. As Table One indicates, both sets of consumers
would rank gray market with corporate control as their second choice. The
problem is that such corporate arrangements would require consent by both

89. Id. at 134.
90. Id. at 135.
91. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm, Ltd., [1997] 73 Can. Pat. Rep. 3d 371,422-23.

92. Id. at 421.
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United States and Canadian firms, and Canadian companies would prefer
a separate existence to common corporate control.
Therefore, it is likely that United States pharmaceutical firms will
exercise their control through licensing practices. While U.S. consumers
would prefer gray markets controlled by licensing to no gray markets at all,
Canadian consumers would prefer no gray markets to gray markets
controlled through licensing. The reimportation bill would make United
States consumers better off, but it would do so at the expense of Canadian
consumers, when the potential responses by the United States and
Canadian pharmaceutical industries are taken into consideration. While I
do not purport to quantify the full benefits and costs of the reimportation
bill here, I do conclude that the bill may not have all the desired benefits
for United States consumers and would affect the licensing practices of
United States companies in a way that may result in benefits to Canadian
companies.
B. The South African Experience
In January 2001, forty drug companies in conjunction with the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa reinstated a
lawsuit against ten members of the South African government, including
the Health Minister and the Registrar ofPatents, challenging the Medicines
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997.93 The case was
initiated in 1998 and dropped in 1999 due to political pressures. The 1997
Amendment permits the development of generic AIDS drugs in South
Africa under compulsory licensing and permits parallel imports of cheap
AIDS drugs into South Africa." The source of the parallel imports are
largely from India, which until recently did not recognize patents on
medicine (but has enacted legislation granting patent protection that will
be effective in 2005). 9' The lawsuit alleged that the Amendment grants the
Health Minister unfettered discretion in regulating the pharmaceutical
industry and allows the Health Minister "to deprive owners of intellectual
property in respect of pharhaceutical products of such property" or
"alternatively to expropriate such property without any provision for
compensation."' The complaint also alleged that the 1997 Amendment

93. Notice of Motion, Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. President of the Republic of S.Africa, no.
4183/98 (Transvaal Provincial Div., Filed Feb. 18, 1998), availableat http://www.cptech.org/ip
/health /sa /pharmasuithtml (last visited May 29,2001) [hereinafter Notice of Motion].
94. Pat Sidley, Experts Hammer Out Drugs Rules, BuSINESS DAY (S.Afr.), Apr. 26, 2001,
at 3.
95. Sara Boseley, LegalRoadshow Rolls on to Brazil, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 20, 2001,
at 13; Donald G. McNeil Jr., Selling Cheap "Generic" Drugs,India'sCopycatsIrkIndustry,N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 1, 2000, at Al.
96. Notice of Motion, supranote 93, at § 2.3.
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violates Article 27 of TRIPS, which defines patentable subject matter and
the scope of patent rights.' Oral hearings were held in the case on March
5, 2001, in Pretoria under a storm of protest. 98 The plaintiffs have since
dropped the suit again," but the South African government is still
struggling with implementation of the 1997 Amendment. 1°°
The South African government's policy is in response to the AIDS
crisis in South Africa (and in much of the developing world) and is in line
with the policies ofmany other countries, including Thailand and Brazil. 10
According to the AIDS law project, access to pharmaceutical treatment is
prohibitive and exacerbated by conditions in the health care infrastructure:
The total pharmaceutical bill for South Africa during 1995
stood at R6.4 billion or US$1 billion. The public sector
prescription drug bill accounted for R1.6 billion (78%
population). While the private sector prescription medicines
counted [sic] for R3.1 billion (22% population). Medicines
sold over the counter accounted for R1.7 billion or US$300
million. It is clear that the private sector is particularly
profitable for the pharmaceutical industry. Medicines are still
the single largest item of expenditure for private medical
insurance schemes. The unequal distribution of medicines and
their costs ensure that the majority of South Africans are
denied quality care and treatment. The attempts by the
government to establish essential drug lists and to introduce
generics have been resisted at every step by the
pharmaceutical industry and many private sectors [sic]
doctors.

97. Notice of Motion, supra note 93, § 2.4.
98. Robert Block, BigDrugFirmsDefendRighttoPatentson AIDS Drugs in South African
Court,WALL ST. ., Mar. 6,2001, at A3.

99. On April 19, 2001, the pharmaceutical companies settled with the South African
government and agreed to provide more affordable AIDS treatment to victims in South Africa.
In response to resounding global denunciation oftheir lawsuit, 39 drug companies
today unconditionally dropped the case they pursued for three years against the
South African government. The end of the lawsuit clears the path for the 1997
Medicines Act to go into force, allowing importation of affordable medicines and
increased use of quality generic drugs.
Joint Press Release, Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Oxfam, Treatment Action Campaign, Drug
Companies in South Africa Capitulate Under Barrage of Public Pressure: Powerful Precedent Set
for Other Developing Countries (Apr. 19, 2001), available at http'//Iists.essential.org/
pipermaiVpharn-policy/2001-April/000944.html.
100. Sidley, supra note 94, at 3.
101. See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 31 (describing policies in Brazil and Thailand).
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Even access to drugs for opportunistic infections in
HIV/AIDS are increasingly limited. This includes no
treatment for CMV retinitis, cryptococcal meningitis, or even
serious cases of candida. In 1998, intravenous acyclovir was
only available in 31% of hospitals; flucanazole was available
in less than 30% while ciprofloxacin was available in 73% of
clinics." 2

In post-Apartheid South Africa, concerns.over economic rights and access
to health care, and especially the promotion of fair opportunity and equal
rights, have been the focus of government policy. Nowhere have these
concerns been more salient than in the treatment and prevention of AIDS.
South Africa's response contrasts with the response ofother countries,
which have been heralded as success stories in controlling the AIDS crisis.
Thailand and Brazil provide such examples. In both Thailand and Brazil,
the governments responded by providing free and reduced cost treatment
to AIDS sufferers and promoted the production of the AIDS drugs.' °3 The

Brazilian government started to manufacture generic versions of the
pharmaceutical products in 1998 after the costs of importing brand-name
drugs became prohibitive.' 4 Although Brazil passed patent legislation in
1996 in order to comply with the World Trade Organization and TRIPS,
the legislation exempts patent protection for "anything commercialized
anywhere in the world by May 14, 1997. " '0' Patented owners who have
sold their patented item anywhere prior to May 14, 1997, the effective date
of the 1996 Patent Act, have exhausted their rights. 6 According to one
report, "[the price of AIDS drugs with no Brazilian generic equivalent
dropped 9 percent from 1996 to 2000. The price of those
that compete with
10 7
generics from Brazilian labs dropped 79 percent.'
Touted as a model for the developing world, Brazil demonstrates how
competition in the pharmaceutical industry can be fostered by limits on
patent rights. What is perhaps key to Brazil's success is the non-recognition
of patent rights for patented items sold before the enactment oftheir patent
102. Zackie Achmat, We Can Use Compulsory Licensing and ParallelImports: A South
African CaseStudy, availableat http://www.hri.ca/partnerslalp/tac/license.shtml (last visited Apr.

12,2001).
103. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 28, 31; see also Christopher S. Mayer, The Brazilian
PharmaceuticalIndustry Goes Walking From Ipanema to Prosperity: Will the New Intellectual
Property Law Spur Domestic Investment?, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 377, 377-80 (1998);
Rosemary Sweeney, Comment, The US. Pushfor Worldwide PatentProtectionfor Drugs Meets
the AIDS Crisisin Thailand:A DevastatingCollision, 9 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y 445,456-58 (2000)
(discussing Thailand's policy).
104. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 28.

105. Id at31.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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law. Such a broad scope of exhaustion of rights permits competition
without the difficulties faced by the South African government in limiting
intellectual property rights. South Africa's patent law dates back to the
1960s, and therefore patent owners have some vested rights that are
protected from retroactive legislation. Permitting gray market
pharmaceuticals serves as apolitical compromise, which, although limiting
the patent owner's right of exclusivity in South Africa, may broadly be
protected by international principles of exhaustion.
Although South Africa may not match Brazil's success in lowering
costs, a gray market strategy may nonetheless be very effective. An
empirical study of gray marketing of pharmaceuticals in the United
Kingdom estimated that permitting gray markets would reduce prices for
pharmaceutical products on average from between thirty three percent and
forty one percent, depending upon the product and the base price used for
comparison.' The study also demonstrated the wide range of prices that
a gray marketer would provide depending upon the source country. °9 For
example, the UK list price for Zerit, an AIDS drug manufactured by Bristol
Meyer Squibb was £ 171.98.110 The equivalent price from a gray marketer
ranged from £65.99 when supplied by a Spanish gray marketer to £ 193.20
when supplied by a gray marketer from the United States.' The gray
market is in itself a varied and complex distribution mechanism that
reflects differences across countries in business regulation, supply costs,
and tastes.
The United States response to South Africa's policies portrays the
politics of gray marketing and intellectual property rights. Until 1999,
South Africa was on the "301 Watch List," a list of countries compiled by
the United States Trade Representative that are in violation ofinternational
treaty obligations under the former General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade." 2 The United States position was that South Africa was not in
compliance with obligations under international law in recognizing and
protecting intellectual property rights. The dropping of South Africa from
the list in 1999 was partly influenced by domestic protest against
pharmaceutical companies and partly influenced by a shift in the Clinton
administration, evidenced by a June 25, 1999, letter from Vice President
Al Gore to Representative James Clyburn, Chair of the Congressional

108. James Love, Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Bill and South
African Reform ofPharmaceuticalPolicies,
availableathttp'//www.cptech.orgpham/sasa-10-97-

html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Editions of the "301 Watch List" are available at http:llwww.ustr.govl (last visited June
5, 2001).
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Black Caucus, supporting compulsory licensing and parallel importation
in South Africa.1 ' President Bush, although he has not discussed the South
African policy in great detail, has made statements that ostensibly support
attempt to promote competition in its pharmaceutical
South Africa's
4
market.1
Albeit with mixed support in the United States, the use of gray
markets to promote competition in the pharmaceutical industry illustrates
an interesting convergence of policies in the United States and South
Africa. Needless to say, the pharmaceutical industry is not a supporter of
gray markets in either country. In the United States, industry opposition has
been voiced through lobbying efforts, and in South Africa, through a
lawsuit. Furthermore, some pharmaceutical companies have attempted to
respond to the crisis in South Africa by providing the drugs for free or
reduced cost. The response by the United States government has been
mixed, reflecting perhaps the influence of the pharmaceutical companies
on administrations in transition.
In assessing and comparing the policies, it is important to recognize
how different the gray markets are in the United States and South Africa.
In the United States, the proposed gray market is a scheme ofreimportation
under which drugs sold by United States companies inthe Canadian market
are bought and resold in the United States. In South Africa, the source of
gray market drugs are not those sold by western pharmaceutical companies
but are manufactured in other developing countries and resold in South
Africa." 5 This difference in structure has important implications for the
effectiveness of gray marketing.
Reimportation of pharmaceuticals in the United States gives the
pharmaceutical companies greater control over the gray market than
reimportation in South Africa. Since the source of the gray market drugs
in the United States are drugs sold into Canada by United States
pharmaceutical companies, the United States companies can effectively
control the size of the gray market. While such control may be desirable,
since it may* lead to price reductions and a narrowing of the price

113. See http://www.cptech.orglip/health/sa/vp-feb-25-99.html.
114. Denise Gellene, Aids Drug Pricing Controversy Opens Door to Wider Debate, L.A.
TIMEs, Mar. 25,2001, at CI; RajaMishra, USPursuesAids-DrugProfitAbroad,BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 22, 2001, at Al.

115. "Indian firms lead the world in the manufacture of generic AIDS drugs. The managing
director of Cipla, Ltd., an Indian generic manufacturer that meets international quality standards,
told me in December that he could make a triple therapy for $500 per year, plus another $200 in
packaging costs." Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 31. For an overview of the principle of exhaustion,
see W.R Cornish, The Free Movement ofGoods I: Pharmaceuticals,PatentsandParallelTrade
and Belinda Isaac, The Free Movement of Goods II: Pharmaceuticals,Paterns and Parallel
Imports, in PHARMACEU1TCAL MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND EUROPEAN LAW (Richard
Goldberg & Julian Lonbay, eds.) 11-44 (2000).
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differential between the two markets, the control over the gray market by
United States companies can limit the effectiveness of the reimportation
policy. In the South African case, on the other hand, the source of the gray
market drugs are manufacturers in other developing countries. The western
pharmaceutical companies cannot control the flow of gray market drugs
into South Africa. Therefore, gray market policies in South Africa will be
more effective in promoting competition in the pharmaceutical industry
than gray market policies in the United States.
A review of the economic analysis as summarized by Table One
provides a basis for comparison. The firm in the destination country can
control the gray market either through licensing practices in the destination
and source country or by merging or entering into some other type of
corporate control arrangement with the firms in the source country. As
discussed above, the firm in the source country would prefer to maintain
its separate existence and would fight attempts to merge. The firm in the
destination country's recourse would be to control gray marketing through
licensing which would be the worst outcome for consumers in the source
country and would be the least desirable form of gray marketing for
consumers in the destination country. Permitting reimportation into the
United States may not be an effective means of lowering prices in the
United States and any benefits to U.S. consumers would come at the
expense of consumers in the source country.
The South African program for creating gray markets would benefit
consumers in both the source and the destination countries and also provide
benefits for firms in the source country. These benefits would arise largely
at the expense of western pharmaceutical companies. Because of the
structure of the gray market for pharmaceuticals in South Africa, western
pharmaceutical companies cannot control the source of the gray market
goods. Consequently, the South African policy would lead to the creation
of an uncontrolled gray market. As Table One indicates, consumers in both
the source and the destination countries would prefer an uncontrolled gray
market as would firms in the source country. However, firms in the
destination country, here the western pharmaceutical companies that would
have exclusive rights to the South African market absent the gray market,
would find the uncontrolled gray market the least desirable outcome. For
these reasons, the gray market policies in South Africa would be more
effective in regulating costs than the proposed policy in the United States.
My assessment of the gray market policies rests on the economics of
gray marketing and the pharmaceutical industry. The analysis raises
questions of the legality of the policy, questions raised in the South African
lawsuit. If, in fact, the benefits from gray marketing come at the expense
of western pharmaceutical companies, as I conclude, does not this finding
strengthen the case against the South African government? More broadly,
how is the creation of a gray market that provides competition to a patent
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owner to be reconciled with exclusive rights granted to a patent owner?
These questions raise other issues about the efficacy of gray marketing as
well as its legality. If the goal is to provide access and establish
competition, why not adopt policies other than gray marketing, such as
income redistribution, the creation of more effective institutions and
infrastructure for the transfer of health care, or preventative disease
policies?" 6 While I cannot address all of these questions in this Article, I
turn to the non-economic issues raised by gray markets in the next Part.
IV. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIMITS OF
GRAY MARKETS

What is intriguing about the use of gray markets in regulating the
pharmaceutical industry is the use by sovereigns ofmarkets to address what
has been seen and largely is a human rights issue. My analysis in this
Article has been on the economics of gray marketing; my goal has been to
fill a gap in our economic understanding of gray markets. The common
perception is that gray markets serve to narrow a price gap between two
markets. While this is certainly an important function of gray markets, it is
important to understand how patent owners can regulate the gray market
through licensing and corporate control decisions. The economics of gray
marketing is more complicated than the mere arbitrage of a price
differential. Instead, gray marketing occurs against a background of
intellectual property rights and decisions about corporate structure and

distribution.
While the economic analysis is helpful, the policy choice entailed in
the creation of gray markets is not purely an economic one. Economic
consequences are important to ascertain and assess in policy determination,
but the economic consequences must be understood in conjunction with
other non-economic values that are raised by the distribution of potentially
life-saving products. I address three issues in this section: (1) the question
of exhaustion; (2) the tension between human rights and economic rights;
and (3) issues of sovereignty and the vesting of patent owners' rights.

116. One possibility that I do not discuss in this Article, but is worth noting, is that gray
marketing policies may strategically support compulsory licensing under the Paris Convention on
Industrial Property and TRIPS. If patent holders respond to gray markets in ways that violate the
working requirements ofthe Paris Convention orthrough anti-competitive techniques, then the state
can make a stronger case for infringing on patent rights through compulsory licensing. Note that
South Africa's policy consists of both compulsory licensing and opening up gray markets. I would
like to thank Professor Jerome Reichman for raising this point with me.
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A. The PrincipleofExhaustion Versus the Right of Exclusion
The principle of exhaustion limits the rights of the patent owner in
controlling the distribution of the patented item in the jurisdiction granting
patent protection. In the United States, the principle is recognized in the
first sale doctrine, which limits the patent owner's right to control the
distribution to the first sale of the patented item. However, the first sale
doctrine for patent law applies only to first sales within the United States
since the patent owner is also granted the exclusive right to import the
patented item into the United States. Within the European Union, the
exhaustion principle applies to sales of the patented item in any of the
member countries, regardless ofwhere the patent owner has received patent
protection. In the case of Merck & Co. v. Stephar, B.V., the owner of a
patent in a drug in the Netherlands attempted to enjoin the reimportation
of the patented drug from Italy, where the drug was unpatented. 17 The
owner had not sold the drugs in the Netherlands, but the patent owner's
rights were exhausted by the sale in Italy even though the drug was not
patented there. 118
The principle of exhaustion offers a curious blend ofuniversalism and
territorialism. The first sale of a patented item relieves the patent owner of
his exclusive distribution rights and makes the right of distribution fall into
the public domain. But the loss of exclusivity applies only to the region
within which the patent rights are recognized. Seemingly, the patented item
is in and not in the public domain at the same time, a paradox that is
resolved by understanding the definition of "public domain." The relevant
public is defined by the geographic scope ofthe patent rights. In the United
States, the geographic scope is the boundaries of the United States; in the
European Union, the scope is the boundaries of the member countries of
the Union. In effect, patent law creates two publics. The first is defined by
the sovereign granting the rights; the second is everyone else. Exclusive
distribution rights may be lost by the first sale to the first public, but not to
the second.
Understanding the principle of exhaustion in relation to the relevant
sovereignty elucidates the principle of exhaustion as it exists under TRIPS.
Article 28 of TRIPS confers onto the patent owner the exclusive rights
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent
thirdparties nothaving [the owner's] consent from the acts of:
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these
purposes that product;

117. Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, E.C.P. 2063 (1981).
118. Id
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(b) where the subject matter ofapatent is aprocess, to prevent
third parties not having [the owner's] consent from the act of
using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for
sale, selling or importing for these purposes at least the
product obtained directly by that process.""
These provisions are qualified by footnote 6, which states that "It]his right,
like all other rights conferred under this Agreement in respect of the use,
sale, importation or other distribution of goods, is subject to the provisions
of Article 6.""12o Under Article 6, "nothing in this Agreement shall be used
to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."''
Article 6 is subject to the requirements of national treatment and most
favored nation treatment under Articles 3 and 4." 2 Under TRIPS, the
principle of exhaustion is a matter of national law that limits the exclusive
rights of the patent owner. The principle, however, cannot be used in a way
that discriminates against foreign nationals in violation of the requirement
of national treatment. Furthermore, a TRIPS signatory cannot apply the
principle of exhaustion in a way that discriminates among fellow
signatories without running afoul of the requirements of most favored
nation treatment.
Signatories to TRIPS have great discretion in how to fashion the
principle ofexhaustion within theirjurisdictions.' As in the United States,
the principle can be applied solely within the boundaries ofthejurisdiction.
Or, as in the European Union, the principle can be applied to the larger
trading territory without regard to differences in patent law. The question
remains how the exhaustion principle is to be applied in developing
countries with emerging patent law, like South Africa. South African patent
law gives the patent owner the exclusive right to use, sell, manufacture, or
import the patented item in South Africa. 24 The Act is silent on the
principle of exhaustion. Gray marketed drugs in South Africa would
infringe the patent owner's rights unless the principle of exhaustion
extinguished the exclusive rights to distribute in South Africa. Such
exhaustion would occur if the patent owner had sold the patented item
before it was reimported into South Africa. In the context of South African

119. TRIPS, supra note 25, art. 28.

120. Id. art. 28 n.6.
121. Iad art. 6.

122. Id. art. 3-4.

123. See Sweeney, supranote 103, at 455-56 (discussing the ambiguous treatment of parallel
imports under TRIPS). See generally Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, ParallelTrade

in the PharmaceuticalIndustry: Implicationsfor Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health
Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.L.J. 185 (1999).
124. See § 45 of Patents Act 57 of 1978, availableat http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/
patlaw.html.
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policy, however, the drugs are being produced in another developing
country before being reimported into South Africa. They are not being
distributed by pharmaceutical companies before being reimported.
Consequently, it is doubtful that the principle of exhaustion would protect
the gray market in South Africa.
The principle of exhaustion is less likely to apply when the patent
owner is not selling or otherwise transacting with the potential gray
marketer. If the gray marketer is not obtaining the patented item from the
patent owner, but instead manufactures the patented item in ajurisdiction
that does not recognize the patent or provides limitations on the patent
owner's rights (such as in India), then the importation of the gray market
goods is not protected under the principle of exhaustion. However, if the
gray marketer does purchase the item from the patent owner, and then
reimports in competition with the patent owner, the gray marketing would
be protected under the principle of exhaustion. The application of the
principle is inconsistent with the economic analysis of controlled gray
marketing. Consumers would prefer uncontrolled gray marketing to
controlled gray marketing. But uncontrolled gray marketing is more likely
to occur when the patent owner cannot exercise control over the gray
market either through licensing practices or through corporate control. It is
precisely when the patent owner cannot exercise such control that the
exhaustion principle will not apply and gray marketing would be
prohibited. The principle of exhaustion protects controlled gray marketing
but not uncontrolled gray marketing to the detriment of consumers in both
countries.
The conflict between economic analysis and legal analysis raises
questions about whether the principle of exhaustion is the appropriate
principle under which to protect gray marketing. As discussed in this Part,
the principle works to prevent a form of gray marketing that is highly
beneficial to consumers. If gray marketing is meant to serve consumerist
ends, then it is best justified by a legal theory that protects the form of gray
marketing that is the most consumer friendly. The principle of exhaustion
is, in the context of gray marketing, antithetical to pro-consumer values.
B. Human Rights and Economic Rights
Within United States jurisprudence human rights and economic rights
have been viewed as distinct and often in conflict. Human rights
jurisprudence in the United States has as its domain protection of political
rights, protection of privacy, usually limited to reproductive and sexual
freedom, and protection of bodily and emotional integrity from the coercive
power of the state and, in some rare instances, of private individuals.
Economic rights jurisprudence, in contrast, focuses on the right to private
property and the right to economic sustenance and well-being. The
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dichotomy in U.S. thinking, however, is not shared by the rest of the world.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes economic freedom,
such as freedom from want, and the rights to health care, education, and
sustenance, as core human rights." International covenants, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, recognize rights in
culture, especially in what would be called rights in indigenous knowledge
and cultural property.126 Human rights and economic rights are more
closely integrated outside the United States context.
Intellectual property rights challenge the dichotomy between human
rights and economic rights, even in the United States. With a focus on
property ownership, commerce and exchange, intellectual property rights
seemingly fall into the category of economic rights. But intellectual
property systems protect cultural expressions and protect access rights
through fair use. In this way, intellectual property rights implicate noneconomic rights as well. Within the United States, this tension is reconciled
by casting intellectual property law in purely utilitarian terms, terms not
protective of the author's personality or of rights protected by other bodies
of law, such as the First Amendment. Recently, however, United States
intellectual property law has had to face the non-economic dimensions of
intellectual property and break out of its utilitarian straightjacket. Issues
raised by indigenous knowledge protection in the developing world and
Native American property in the United States stretch existing intellectual
property doctrine and regimes to protect non-economic values and aspects
of culture divorced from commercial uses. International treaty obligations
under the Berne Convention require recognition of some form of moral or
author's rights, which have been implemented, albeit narrowly, through
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). 2 7 Finally, legal claims of free speech
and freedom of exercise have been raised in intellectual property
infringement cases although with little success for the claimants.
The debate over pharmaceuticals is another example of the continuing
confrontation between economic and non-economic, or human, rights. The
solution of gray marketing, largely a political compromise, reflects an
intriguing use of the market to correct aproblem of distribution and access.
Another example of market means to reach human rights ends is provided
by the use of competition policy in South Africa and Indonesia, as
documented by Professor Eleanor Fox. 8 Professor Fox points out that

125. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is available at http://www.un.org
/overview/rights.html (last visited June 5, 2001).
126. See Coombe, supranote 23, at 59-60.
127. Visual Artists Rights Act; 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2001).
128. EleanorM. Fox, Equality Discrimination,andCompetitionLaw: LessonsFromandFor
South Africa and Indonesia,41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 579, 579-94 (2000).
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competition policy has been and can be used in South Africa and Indonesia
129
to challenge the control that ethnic majorities have over minorities.
While competition policy has often been seen as a means of achieving
economic efficiency, or the maximization of aggregate social wealth
without consideration of its distribution, Professor Fox suggests that such
policy can also be used to redistribute resources from the economically
powerful to those who are weaker.'O Such redistribution occurs through the
leveling of the market playing field and the lowering of entry barriers that
improves access to the marketplace.' 31 The leveling of the field and the
lowering of barriers also has the effect of promoting competition and
improving aggregate wealth.
Professor Fox's argument is a very conventional process-based
understanding ofredistribution and efficiency. By focusing legal regulation
on the protection of market and political outsiders, competition can be
fostered in market and political processes with benefits for society as a
whole. Gray marketing policies, I would argue, are of a different species
from process-based policies. Gray markets foster competition by creating
an additional channel of access for consumers in the marketplace. They
work in one dimension, and that is the lowering of price. The market
process is not necessarily corrected nor is a level playing field created. The
creation of a gray market does not foreclose the possibility of incumbent
firms controlling the gray market through licensing or corporate policies.
Instead, the state has created a channel for distribution made possible by
global price differences and otherwise foreclosed by rights of exclusion
created by intellectual property law.
Gray markets, in a certain sense, do not create new rights. They create
new institutions that place some limitations on the patent owner's rights.
Whether they protect or create economic or human rights is an unimportant
and ultimately nebulous question. Instead, gray markets highlight that what
is at stake in intellectual property systems is the relationship between
ownership and control. One's views about how intellectual property
systems should be structured rest on one's acceptance of the following two
normative propositions:
Proposition One: The creator of intellectual property should
be its owner.
Proposition Two: The owner of intellectual132property should
have absolute control over its distribution.

129. Id. at 583.
130. Id. at 593.

131. Id.
132. Shubha Ghosh, Ownership, Control, and the Public Domain: The Case of Indigenous
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If one accepts both of these propositions, then the resulting intellectual
property system would be one of strong intellectual property rights. If one
rejects both, then the resulting system is one of open access. Most
proponents of intellectual property law reject one of these propositions. In
the context of gray market policies, the debate is over the second
proposition, with supporters of gray marketing contending that
unauthorized distribution should not imply illegal distribution. But
supporters of gray marketing also need to consider the other means of
control that can be exercised by intellectual property owners through
licensing and corporate control decisions.
I state the debate in terms ofthese two propositions because I feel they
are ultimately more helpful than thinking in dichotomies such as human
and economic rights. The two propositions also are more precise than
process based applications of legal doctrine to protect minority rights,
whether they are categorized as human rights or economic rights. The key
question for the creation of intellectual property systems is ascertaining
who should be the owner, who should be able to exercise control, and the
logically prior questions of what can and cannot be owned or controlled.
The gray market debate, and the economic analysis ofPart H, illustrates the
difficult problems in determining ownership and control issues when
ownership can be established and control exercised in strategic, and not
always predictable, ways. But recognizing the roles of ownership and
control in intellectual property rights systems adds important dimensions
to assessing gray marketing and potentially other intellectual property
policies.
C. Sovereignty and PatentRights in a GlobalArena
The previous section indicated a deficiency in using the principle of
exhaustion to protect gray marketing. The principle is designed to limit the
control of the patent owner over the distribution of the patented item. But
in the context of gray markets, the principle does not protect gray markets
in the case where gray markets are the most desirable: gray markets that
cannot be controlled by the patent owner. The legality of gray markets can
be defended on the principle of exhaustion in many situations, but not in
scenarios presented by South Africa where the source of the gray market
goods are another developing country where the goods are manufactured.
The issues raised by this structure of gray marketing raises questions of
sovereignty, particularly the ability of the state to fashion and refashion
patent rights.

Knowledge Protection (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Under TRIPS, signatory nations can limit or take intellectual property
rights through eminent domain in case of national emergency. South
Africa, while once considering declaring its AIDS epidemic a national
emergency, has declined to do so. While a state of emergency would have
given the government wide latitude in altering intellectual property rights,
the government still has the power to limit the exclusivity ofpatent rights.
Furthermore, the proposal for reimportation in the United States also
presents issues of violation of property rights and expropriation of the
rights of the patent owner. While in South Africa and in the United States
the patent owner would still have recognized patent rights, one stick in the
bundle, the exclusive right to distribute in the jurisdiction, has been taken
away.
The reimportation plans of both governments would most likely be
protected under Article 30 of TRIPS, which states: "Members may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of
third parties."'3 The key is determining what is an "unreasonable conflict,"
"a normal exploitation," "unreasonable prejudice," and "legitimate
interests." Arguably, the creation of an alternative distribution channel for
the dissemination of a fife-saving drug that allows the patent owner to
retain most of the rights granted under patent law would meet the standards
of Article 30. It is important to point out that Article 30 permits the
government to alter patent rights without having to pay compensation. The
compensation requirement is express under Article 31, which applies only
when Article 30 does not, that is, to modifications of rights that do
unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation or do unreasonably
prejudice a legitimate interest of the patent owner.' 31 The South African
and United States governments would have legal support for their position
that creating a gray market does not infringe on the rights of the
pharmaceutical companies in their patents.
The state strategy of creating gray markets creates two important
issues with which I will end my comments and leave for future debate. The
issues have to do with sovereignty and rights.13 As my economic analysis
described, patent owners will respond to gray markets and the response
may involve more transnational control over how patented items are
distributed and their sale price. Although national sovereigns can control
some of this activity (for example, by limits on transnational mergers),
133. TRIPS, supra note 25, art. 30.
134. Id.art. 31.
135. See Coombe, supranote 23, at 90 (commenting on the centrality of state sovereignty in
the human rights arena).
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sovereigns will have to coordinate their policies and activities to control the
responses to the gray market. While the battles may play out in legislative
politics (as they are in the United States), the real forum will be the
marketplace. What is troubling about the gray market policies is that the
hierarchy of politics and markets is reversed. Instead of sovereigns
regulating market activities, the market is created to resolve political
battles. Within the marketplace, national governments and patent owners
combined with manufacturers and retailers are competing sovereigns,
determining claims of access and distribution. The competition among
sovereigns has become transparent as several pharmaceuticals in South
Africa have ceded their claims and now offer to provide drugs for free and
to develop infrastructure for delivery and access, activities deemed as
traditional sovereign functions.
What is even more troubling about the creation of gray markets as a
policy tool is that rights have seemingly vanished. Gray markets in
pharmaceuticals are used to protect rights without recognizing them.
Pragmatically, the distinction might not matter. If the goal is to provide
health care to the indigent and gray marketing does provide the necessary
access, as presumed, then what difference does it make that the policy was
not based on an institutional recognition of rights?'36 But looking purely at
results and not means ignores certain values, such as a sovereign's
commitment to obligations, particularly the obligations to its citizens,
especially the most indigent.
Reinforcing my earlier point, this lack of commitment reinforces the
ceding of sovereignty. Even if the policies make some companies provide
the drugs more cheaply or for free or invest in infrastructure, the question
remains about what is the long term benefit. In The Age of Access,
commentator Jeremy Rifkin laments that in the information age governed
by intellectual property law, fewer and fewer people actually own anything
except for a right to access. 37 Information, knowledge, and innovative
products are not bought and sold but licensed and loaned. 3 ' Gray markets

136. The point could be made that South Africa's policy of promoting gray markets has
worked to lower prices. Several of the pharmaceutical companies doing business in South Africa,
relenting to political pressures and perhaps to the economic pressures from the gray market, have
agreed to lower the prices for AIDS drugs in South Africa. The question is whether these changes
are short or long-term and how they will change the system of health care delivery and access in
South Africa and other countries. See Carol Bellamy, How to DistributeAIDS Drugs,N.Y. TIES,

Mar. 26, 2001, at A19.
137. JEREMY PtwKlN, THE AGEOF ACCESS: THENEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALiSM WHERE
ALL OF LFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE 4-5 (2000).
138. The role of leasing in extending the market power of a monopolist has been studied
extensively by economists. The seminal article is written by R.H. Coase, DurabilityandMonopoly,
15 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972) (demonstrating why a monopolist selling durable goods would prefer
to lease rather than sell the good). See also John Shepard Wiley Jr. et al., The LeasingMonopolist,
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for pharmaceuticals reinforce this type of society where rights of access are
granted to life-saving pharmaceuticals without recognizing a right to a
certain quality of life or standard of living. While, in the short run, gray
markets are beneficial and are, perhaps, even a practical and politically
available instrument in the long run, the appeal of gray markets should not
blind policy and lawmakers to commitments to institutions that protect and
respect individuals."39
V. SUMMARY
In two different jurisdictions, gray markets have been appealed to as
a way .to protect interests that may be viewed solely as a matter of human
rights. In the United States, gray marketing was chosen largely out of
political feasibility. In South Africa, the solution was part of creating a
market for generic pharmaceuticals in conjunction with compulsory
licensing. In this Article, I have presented an economic analysis of gray
marketing and have demonstrated that its effectiveness rests on how the
patent owner responds to the creation of gray markets through his licensing
and corporate control practices. I conclude that the economic effect of gray
marketing will depend upon how the gray market is structured. Since the
United States and South African policies structure gray markets very
differently, the policies will have quite different effects, with greater
effectiveness in South Africa than in the United States.
While a large part of this Article has been devoted to the economics
of gray marketing, I conclude the Article by considering the legal issues
surrounding gray marketing, particularly the tension between economic and
human rights, the application of the principle of exhaustion, and the
question of vested rights and expropriation. There are strong legal
arguments to defend gray marketing, but the form of gray
marketing-uncontrolled or controlled---can be affected by the
interpretation of particular legal doctrines, specifically the principle of
exhaustion. I conclude that ultimately the question of gray marketing is one
of the scope of sovereignty in defining and altering intellectual property
rights, a scope that I contend is relatively broad under TRIPS. Gray
marketing, whether applied to pharmaceuticals or other industries, offers
a rich case study through which to understand sovereignty, intellectual
property policy, and the ownership and control structure imposed by
intellectual property law.

37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 696-97 (1990) (discussing Coase's 1972 article and its applications to
antitrust law).
139. I have in mind here the conception of human rights that expressly recognizes power and
political and economic relationships, as opposed to the ethnocentric notion, discussed by Professor
Mutua. See supranote 22, at 207 (critiquing the human rights paradigm for ignoring power).
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